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The siting of Marine LNG facilities in the United States requires application of the Title 49 of the 
Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 193, Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities: Federal Safety 
Standards[1], and NFPA 59A – 2001 Edition, Standard for the Production, Storage, and Handling 
of Liquefied Natural Gas [2].  In addition, the guidance for LNG siting application available in the 
PHMSA (US DOT Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration) web site is also 
required.  
 
One of the most important items for LNG facility siting is the Hazards Analysis, which consists in 
the identification of the SALS (Single Accidental Leakage Source) by analyzing all piping in the 
facility.  The SALSs for conventional piping are defined based on the size and length of the lines 
and the application of a failure rate table provided by PHMSA [3].  This methodology may 
generate scenarios with large flammable gas clouds, especially for long lines such as the LNG 
loading line and rundown line.  Vapor barriers are a design solution acceptable by the regulators 
and commonly used to prevent vapor clouds from reaching a property that could be built upon [4]. 
 
This paper presents the application of Pipe-in-Pipe (PiP) technology for the LNG rundown line 
and the LNG loading line (which runs over a marine trestle).  The Pipe-in-Pipe consists of an inner 
pipe designed for the process conditions of the particular service, insulation material wrapping the 
inner pipe, and an outer pipe.  The outer pipe is designed to provide full containment in the unlikely 
event of a leak from the inner pipe and to withstand any thermal deformation due to exposure to 
cryogenic temperatures.  Any leakage from the inner pipe is directed to the flare system. 
 
With the application of PiP technology for the LNG loading line and rundown line, any potential 
leaks in the inner piping will be contained by the outer pipe and directed to a safe disposition.  If 
approved by FERC and USCG, this technology will allow proposed LNG projects the potential 
for reduced flammable gas clouds, reducing the need for other mitigations, such as vapor barriers.  
Another advantage of the PiP technology is that any leak in the marine area will be contained by 
the outer pipe, allowing the reduction of the liquid containment system for facilities with long 
trestles over water. 
 
Introduction 
The requirements for the siting of LNG facilities in the Unites States siting are regulated by FERC 
(Federal Energy Regulatory Commission) and DOT PHMSA (Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 
Safety Administration), to ensure that that the design will be safe for the plant personnel and the 
surrounding community. FERC is responsible for authorizing the siting and construction of 
onshore and near shore LNG import or export facilities [5].  
 
The regulatory code that establish the siting requirements is Title 49 of the Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR) Part 193, Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities: Federal Safety Standards [1], 
which includes NFPA 59A – 2001 Edition, Standard for the Production, Storage, and Handling 
of Liquefied Natural Gas [2] by reference.  
 
Below is a summary of the key siting requirements:  
 
 Thermal radiation protection heat flux exclusion zone: 
a) 1,600 Btu/hr/ft2 (5,000 W/m2) at a property line that can be built upon for ignition of a 
design spill. 
b) 1,600 Btu/hr/ft2 (5,000 W/m2) at the nearest point located outside the owner’s property line 
that, at the time of plant siting, is used for outdoor assembly by groups of 50 or more 
persons for a fire over an impounding area. 
c) 3,000 Btu/hr/ft2 (9,000 W/m2) at the nearest point of the building or structure outside the 
owner’s property line that is in existence at the time of plant siting and used for 
occupancies. 
d) 10,000 Btu/hr/ft2 (30,000 W/m2) at a property line that can be built upon for a fire over an 
impounding area. 
 Flammable vapor-gas dispersion exclusion zone: 
a) Any potential flammable gas cloud from a design spill at the concentration of ½ LFL 
(Lower Flammable Limit) cannot extend beyond the property line that can be built upon 
and that would result in a distinct hazard. 
 Vapor cloud explosion exclusion zone: 
a) Vapor cloud explosions are modelled for the confirmed/congested areas. 
b) 1 psi overpressure cannot extent beyond the facility limits. 
c) LNG storage tanks must withstand any potential blast overpressure.    
 Design spills are calculated for each line based on the PHMSA’s Nominal Failure Rate Table, 
which is applied to determine if the threshold 3 x 10-5 failures per year is exceeded [3].  Then 
flammable gas dispersion, thermal radiation, and blast overpressure are modeled for the 
bounding scenarios.  Section 2 has more details and examples. 
 
One of the main challenges typically faced during the concept phase of an LNG facility project in 
the United States is to develop the Plot Plan in a way that the safety of the community and plant 
personnel is assured, it will comply with the applicable regulations, and the plot plan foot print is 
compatible with the project objectives in regard to land acquisition.  The flammable vapor 
dispersion exclusion zone is typically the main constraint and is the primary focus of this paper. 
1. Design Spill Criteria 
 
The design spills from the LNG process and transfer lines are defined based on the criteria 
established by PHMSA for the Single Accidental Leakage Sources (SALS), based on the Nominal 
Failure Rate Table and the comparison with a threshold of 3 x 10-5 failures per year of operation 
(one failure every 30,000 years).  
 
PHMSA’s Nominal Failure Rate Table is available on its web site [3], and is based on published 
failure rates.  The table provides the failure rates for piping equivalent hole sizes based on the 
length and diameter of the piping. 
 
There are four categories for the equivalent hole sizes: 
 Catastrophic failure (full bore rupture). 
 1/3 of the pipe diameter. 
 10% of the pipe diameter, up to 2 inches. 
 1 inch. 
 
The duration of the selected releases is defined as 10 minutes.  
 
2. Challenge with Long LNG Pipe Runs 
 
The challenge with PHMSA’s failure rate and pipe size criteria is that long LNG pipe runs and 
large pipe diameters will lead to large calculated flammable vapor clouds foot prints. 
 
As an example, depending on the layout of a multi-train LNG facility with marine loading the 
length of the rundown lines (lines from the LNG trains to the LNG tanks) and the loading lines 
(lines from the LNG tanks to the loading berths) can be several thousands of feet, which will 
typically result in either 1/3 of the pipe diameter failure scenario or a full bore rupture being the 
controlling design case.  Figure 1 has a depiction of the rundown lines and loading lines for a 
hypothetical marine LNG facility. 
 
Figure 1: Typical marine LNG facility 
 
A hypothetical SALS scenario for a 24” LNG rundown line with a length of 3,000 ft is shown on 
Figure 2.  The SALS table would show a hole size of 8” (1/3 of the diameter), and the predicted ½ 




Figure 2: Hypothetical SALS for LNG Loading Line 
 
In cases like this, the facility foot print would have to extend beyond the predicted ½ LFL gas 
cloud contour unless mitigations (typically “Vapor Barriers”) are provided.  Vapor barriers are 
commonly used to contain the release of flammable mixtures in LNG facilities in the United States 
[4].  Vapor barriers could be added along the marine jetty (see Figure 3), internally at the facility, 
or at the property line (see Figure 4).  Dispersion modelling using CFD (computational fluid 
dynamics) software is required to identify the locations requiring vapor barriers, and also to 
demonstrate their effectiveness to the regulatory agencies. 
Other vapor cloud mitigation alternatives are:  
 Spacing. 
 Engineering design (e.g. multiple smaller pipes). 
 
 
Figure 3: Vapor Barrier on Marine Jetty  
(Figure courtesy of GexCon US / Figure extracted from FERC e-library document “Downeast LNG Project – 
Revised Vapor Dispersion Modelling at http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/Doc_Family.asp?document_id=14117516 ) [6] 
 
 
Figure 4: Vapor Barriers on Facility Property Line  





3. Potential Disadvantages of Vapor Barriers 
 
While it is acceptable by the regulators and applied successfully as a solution to force the predicted 
flammable gas clouds to stay within the limits required by the regulations, vapor barriers also 
present some potential disadvantages:   
 In the event of a release, the gas cloud will be developed inside the vapor barrier limits, 
potentially increasing the escalation risk.  
 Obstructions to physical access and visual inspection of the piping (e.g., vapor barriers along 
a marine jetty). 
 Maintenance on vapor barriers required over the lifetime of the facility. 
 Vapor barriers are designed to withstand the predicted winds at the facility location and may 
be large structures. 
 
4. Alternative Solution for Vapor Cloud Reduction 
 
An alternative solution for complying with the flammable gas exclusion zone regulations without 
the provision of vapor barriers is the application of Pipe-in-Pipe technology for long and large 
diameter LNG lines, typically the rundown and loading lines. 
The Pipe-in-Pipe system consists on an inner pipe designed for the process conditions of a 
particular service, with insulation material located in the continuous annular space between the 
inner and outer pipe.  The outer pipe is designed to provide full containment in the event of a leak 
from the inner pipe and to withstand any thermal deformation due to exposure to cryogenic 
temperatures.  All welded construction is used for both the inner and the outer pipe.  The specific 
piping materials for the inner pipe in the outer pipe on a Pipe-in-Pipe system is outside of the scope 
of this paper.  See Figure 5 for a view of a typical Pipe-in-Pipe.  
 
 
Figure 5: Typical Pipe-in-Pipe Cross Section 
 
Since the main feature of the Pipe-in-Pipe technology for the LNG loading line and rundown line 
is to have any potential leaks from the inner pipe contained by the outer pipe, the probability of a 
simultaneous failure on the inner and outer pipe is extremely low, as covered in detail in the next 
section. 
If a leak occurs in the inner pipe, it will be detected by continuous monitoring of the annular space, 
which can be achieved by temperature measurement via fiber optics for the length of the pipe, 
pressure monitoring, and/or gas composition monitoring.  Any leakage can be directed to a safe 
disposition, such as a flare system. 
 
5. Failure Rate for Conventional Pipe and Pipe-in-Pipe 
 
DOT PHMSA (Department of Transportation Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety 
Administration) defines the hole sizes for the SALSs as the calculated failure rate based on pipe 
diameter and length, using the PHMSA provided Nominal Failure Rate Table, compared with the 
failure rate criterion of 3x10-5 failures per year [3]. 
The tables below show the credible SALS hole sizes for a hypothetical LNG pipe of 20” diameter 
and 3,000 ft length for two configurations: 
 Conventional pipe (See Table 1 for failure rate calculation details). 
 Pipe-in-Pipe system – 20” inner pipe / 24” outer pipe (See Table 2 for failure rate calculation 
details).   
The PHMSA Nominal Failure Rate Table does not directly address Pipe-in-Pipe, therefore we 
calculated the SALS based on the failure rate for a simultaneous failure of the inner pipe and the 
outer pipe, applying PHMSA published failure rates [3].  
 
 
Table 1: Prescribed SALS Hole Sizes – 20” / 3,000 ft – Conventional Piping 
 
As seen on results from Table 1, for a LNG line of 20” diameter and 3,000 ft length, if 
conventional piping is used, the dispersion analysis is required for a hole size of up to 1/3 of the 
diameter (6.7”), which most probably will generate a large ½ LFL flammable gas contour, 
requiring either a larger facility foot print or the adoption of vapor barriers to contain the 
potential gas cloud inside the facility limits. 
Type of Failure
Failures per year of operation  
(conventional)
Failures per year of operation  
Total Pipe length: 
3,000 ft = 914 m
PHMSA failure rate 
criterion of 3x10-5 
failures per year
Piping: 500mm (20-inch) ≤d < 1000mm (40-inch)  
Catastrophic rupture 2E-8 per meter of piping 1.83E-05 Not applicable
Release from hole with effective diameter of 
1/3 diameter
1E-7 per meter of piping 9.14E-05 Applicable
Release from hole with effective diameter of 
10% diameter, up to 50mm (2-inches)
2E-7 per meter of piping 1.83E-04 Applicable
Release from hole with effective diameter of 
25mm (1-inch)
4E-7 per meter of piping 3.66E-04 Applicable
 
 
Table 2: Prescribed SALS Hole Sizes – 20” / 3,000 ft – Pipe-in-Pipe system 
 
If a Pipe-in-Pipe system is used for this hypothetical LNG line, based on results from Table 2 for 
a simultaneous failure on both internal and external piping, the dispersion analysis for holes sizes 
as small as 1 inch is not applicable, since the calculated failure rate is smaller than PHMSA 
threshold of 3 x 10-5 failure per year, and that will allow the LNG facility to design a more compact 
overall property foot print. 
 
An additional advantage of the Pipe-in-Pipe system is that the required liquid containment system 
along the LNG transfer lines will be fulfilled by the outer pipe, therefore no open trenches and 
sump system for secondary liquid containment will be necessary.  These features make the Pipe-
in-Pipe system an acceptable option with a better approach to process safety and provide less 
exposure for the public and plant personnel.   
 
6. Regulatory Submissions 
  
The use of the Pipe-in-Pipe system is currently not covered in the regulations that currently govern 
siting of LNG facilities ( Title 49 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 193, Liquefied 
Natural Gas Facilities: Federal Safety Standards [1], and NFPA 59A – 2001 Edition, Standard 
for the Production, Storage, and Handling of Liquefied Natural Gas [2].)  The 2013 edition of 
NFPA 59A covers cryogenic Pipe-in-Pipe systems.    
The use of this system in the design of proposed LNG plant projects in the United States will 
require regulatory review on a case-by-case basis and the demonstration of an equivalent or better 
level of safety compared with a conventional piping system. A special permit process with the 
applicable regulatory agencies may be required [3].  
If approved by the regulatory agencies, the Pipe-in-Pipe technology will allow proposed LNG 
projects: 
 Significant reduction of flammable gas clouds probability and size scenarios, potentially 
eliminating the need for vapor barriers. 
 Enhanced secondary liquid containment system for the PiP sections, with no open trenches. 
 An alternative approach to prevent incidents and potential escalation. 
Type of Failure
Failures per year of operation 
(inner pipe)
Total Pipe length: 
3,000 ft = 914 m
Failures per year of operation 
(outer pipe)
Total Pipe length: 
3,000 ft = 914 m
Failures per year of 
operation (PiP system)
Total Pipe length: 
3,000 ft = 914 m
PHMSA failure rate 
criterion of 3x10-5 
failures per year
Piping: 500mm (20-inch) ≤d < 1000mm (40-inch)  
Catastrophic rupture 1.83E-05 1.83E-05 3.34E-10 Not applicable
Release from hole with effective diameter of 
1/3 diameter
9.14E-05 9.14E-05 8.35E-09 Not applicable
Release from hole with effective diameter of 
10% diameter, up to 50mm (2-inches)
1.83E-04 1.83E-04 3.34E-08 Not applicable
Release from hole with effective diameter of 
25mm (1-inch)
3.66E-04 3.66E-04 1.34E-07 Not applicable
There is at least one proposed LNG facility design incorporating Pipe-in-Pipe currently under 




The Pipe-in-Pipe technology, presented in this paper, which consists of two concentric pipes on a 
full containment system, provides an alternative option to conventional piping for LNG transfer 
lines of large diameter and long extension.  Pipe-in-Pipe allows proposed projects to design their 
facilities with a significant reduction on flammable gas clouds probability and size and enhanced 
process safety features for better protection of the public and plant personnel. 
This technology has not yet been used for this application in previous LNG projects and would 
require prospective projects to pursue approval from the applicable regulatory agencies through a 
special permit or safety equivalency submission.  This process is currently ongoing for at least one 
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